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Over two decades have passed since the dissolution of the communist system and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 yet there is still no consensus over the causes
and consequences of these epochal (and distinct) events. As for the causes, it is easy to
assume that the fall was ‘over-determined’, with an endless array of factors. It behoves the
scholar to try to establish a hierarchy of causality, which is itself a methodological exercise
in heuristics. However, the arbitrary prioritisation of one factor over another is equally
a hermeneutic trap that needs to be avoided. Following an examination of the various
‘why’ factors, we focus on ‘what’ exactly happened at the end of the Soviet period. We
examine the issue through the prism of reformulated theories of modernisation. The Soviet
system was a sui generis approach to modernisation, but the great paradox was that the
system did not apply this ideology to itself. By attempting to stand outside the processes
which it unleashed, both society and system entered a cycle of stagnation. The idea of neo-
modernisation, above all the idea that societies are challenged to come to terms with the
‘civilisation of modernity’, each in their own way, provides a key to developments. In the
end the Soviet approach to this challenge failed, and the reasons for this need to be
examined, but the challenge overall remains for post-communist Russia.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 the debate over the causes and consequences is far
from over. The nature of the phenomenon is itself con-
tested. What exactly ended in 1991? We know that the
Communist order was formally dissolved, with the banning
of the Communist Party in Russia on 22 August 1991, in the
tumultuous days following the failed coup of 18–21 August.
Yet the dissolution of Communist power had begun much
earlier, and in effect the reforms conducted under thearch Center, Hanyang
r
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hamoniker of perestroika by Mikhail Gorbachev since 1985
had achieved an astonishing self-transcendence of the
earlier political system. In other words, by 1991 the tradi-
tional Soviet-style communist system had already given
way to something else. The organisational power of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had been
destroyed by the abolition of the traditional branches of the
Secretariat in September 1988, in the wake of the various
reforms launched by the Nineteenth Party Conference in
June–July 1988. Equally, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union in December 1991 had already been presaged by
a qualitative change in the nature of the country, reﬂected
in continuing debates over changing the name of the new
entity to something along the lines of a Union of Sovereign
States. The ‘what collapsed’ question could be indeﬁnitely
extended to include, inter alia, long-term processes such as
the collapse of empire in Russia and the exhaustion of the
communist ideal in the world at large.nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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search for an interpretative framework. While there is no
doubt that the Soviet Union collapsed as a result of its own
contradictions, the nature of these contradictions needs to
be explored, something that I will explore later. The
contradictions that led to ‘1989’ (taken as the symbolic date
for the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’ in Eastern Europe),
moreover, were different from those that precipitated 1991
(the combined dissolution of the communist system and
the disintegration of the Soviet state). It is now clear that
the ‘meaning’ of 1989 is very different from that of ‘1991’.
The ‘revolutions’ in 1989 in Eastern Europe shrugged off
Soviet power and inﬂuence (even though by then the Soviet
Union was reforming itself out of existence), the structures
of communist rule, and reoriented the countries to the path
of Western integration. The ‘return to Europe’ represented
a powerful ideal, but it was a spatial rather than a philo-
sophical programme (Judt, 2007). The meaning of 1991 is
far less clear. The former Soviet republics could not share
the spatial (geopolitical) orientation of 1989, except for the
Baltic republics and possibly Moldova, and it was precisely
the attempt of some other countries to shift from the
problematic of 1991 to that of 1989 that in the end
provoked conﬂict, notably the Russo-Georgianwar of 2008.
Russia always considered itself to be a distinct geopolitical
pole of its own and later perpetuated ‘1991’ as a separate
project, while the countries in the ‘new Eastern Europe’
along the Soviet Union’s western borders remain trapped
between 1989 and 1991.
The fundamental contradiction that precipitated the
Soviet fall was that between the attempt to create
a ‘modern’ society, deﬁned as one characterised by indus-
trialisation, secularisation, urbanisation and ration-
alisation, and the simultaneous attempt to create an
alternative modernity. The central features of this alterna-
tive modernity included the abolition of the free market,
the attempt to achieve the direct expression of popular
sovereignty as represented in the party-state, the inversion
of typically modern forms of class hierarchy (which in the
event allowed a bureaucratic class to predominate), and
a permanently revisionist stance in international affairs,
deﬁned as the aspiration to revise the existing international
order, even though in practice the Soviet Union became in
effect a status quo power. The contradiction in interna-
tional affairs, as in all other aspects, was never resolved. In
the next section I brieﬂy examine some of the immediate
factors precipitating the fall, and then I turn to some of the
broader questions associated with modernisation, demo-
cratisation and the larger phenomenon of the communist
collapse.
The ‘why’ question
At the heart of debates over 1991 is the ‘why’ question.
Why did a system that had defeated the world’s most
powerful military force in 1941–1945, that had launched
the world’s ﬁrst artiﬁcial satellite (Sputnik 1) into earth’s
orbit on 4 October 1957, achieved the ﬁrst circumlocution
of the globe by Yuri Gagarin on 12 April 1961, gained
strategic parity with the United States in the mid-1970s,
and attained standards of living typical of a mid-leveldeveloped country, collapse so precipitously? The
answers can typically be categorised into short, medium
and long-term factors, but at all levels the various factors
are contested. Let us look at some of the immediate factors.
a) There is no simple answer to the question about the
economic viability of the Soviet order. Although by the
late 1980s there were clear signs of economic strain,
with a long-term decline in economic growth rates and
stagnating standards of living, accompanied by declines
in economic competitiveness, productivity and rates of
investment and innovation. Very few sectors or indus-
tries were internationally competitive. Nevertheless up
to 1989 growth continued at some 3 per cent. This may
well have represented a fall from what had been ach-
ieved earlier, but in part the decline reﬂected amaturing
of the economy. The sharp fall in theprice of oil, from$66
abarrel in1980 to $20abarrel in1986 (in2000prices), as
Saudi Arabia released a surplus onto a saturatedmarket,
provoked a severe budgetary crisis. Yegor Gaidar in his
End of Empire stresses the distorted nature of the Soviet
economy, and in particular the catastrophically high
proportionof resourcesdevoted to serve theneedsof the
military–industrial complex (Gaidar 2006). The
economy had become ‘structurally militarised’, with at
least 18 per cent of GDP devoted to servicing its needs.
However, Michael Ellmann and Vladimir Kontorovich
take amore sanguine view, arguing that although under
strain therewas no terminal crisis of the Soviet economy
(Ellman & Kontorovich, 1998).
Others refuse to contrast the Soviet and Western
systems as two discrete orders. The status of the Soviet
Union as an alternative was increasingly eroded. Immanuel
Wallerstein notes that Western radicals after 1968
‘attacked the role of the Soviet Union, which they saw as
a collusive participant in US hegemony, a feeling that had
been growing everywhere, since at least 1956’ (Wallerstein,
2011: 76). Wallerstein and others argue that it was
precisely Soviet, and even more Eastern European partici-
pation in the world economic system, that provoked their
collapse (Gunder Frank, 1992). This would lead to the
region becoming ‘third worldised’, which Frank intimated
was the purpose of Western ‘assistance’.
A different type of structural perspective argues that the
Soviet system was unable to make the transition from
a Fordist-Keynesian industrial system of mass production
and mass consumption to what David Harvey calls a ‘ﬂex-
ible accumulation regime’, no longer dominated in the
West by the old triad of big state, labour and capital or in
the East by the monolithic planning system (Harvey, 1990;
Verdery, 1996). In other words, the Soviet collapse was in
part precipitated by the challenge of globalisation,
although this could well be to confuse cause and effect: it
was only after the fall of communism that globalisation
theory became the dominant paradigm of our age (for
a critique, see Rosenberg, 2001, 2005). Indeed, the removal
of the European communist challenge allowed a triumphal
capitalism to emerge, that was in the end beset by its own
contradictions once bereft of the disciplining and con-
straining effect of the Soviet experiment.
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political factors. The fundamental contradiction in the
political sphere was the attempt to implement
elements of ‘commune democracy’: the fusion of
executive and legislative functions in the soviets, and
the absence of the separation of powers (despite
constant carping against podmena, the excessive inter-
vention of party structures in state organs). Commune
democracy assumes that the interests of the principal
(in this case, the sovereign people) and the agent
(communist political structures) were one and the
same, thus denying any space for political pluralism or
even socialist forms of contestation. The Tsarist claim to
embody the deepest interests of the people was
perpetuated in new forms by the CPSU, and thus this
archaic form of governance was reproduced by the
Soviet counter-modernity, and thus it became, in this
respect at least, anti-modern. The pseudo-
constitutionalism of the late Tsarist era gave way to
the sham constitutionalism of the Soviet epoch (Sakwa,
2009). Gorbachev’s initial attempts to revive commune
democracy during perestroika only exacerbated the
problems rather than resolving them (Sakwa, 1989).
Political reformhad longbeenurgedon theSoviet leaders,
but although long-delayed, when it came it was in a tumul-
tuous rush that refuted the arguments of those who argued
that the Soviet Unionwas incapable of political reform. Since
at least the late 1950s a generation ofmore critical and open-
minded individualsworked inthesystemitself, notably those
advanced by Yuri Andropov when he was head of the CC’s
International Department under Nikita Khrushchev such as
Alexander Bovin, Yuri Shakhnazarov, Georgy Arbatov and
Nikolai Shishlin. A range of critical institutshchiki appeared
based in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, notably in IMEMO
(Pittey, 2009). The problemwas that that the reform tsunami
was toomuch, too late; overwhelming the system’s ability to
absorb innovation and rupturing existing political ties and
systems of governance. Stephen Cohen is certainly right to
stress that there had always been historical alternatives
within the Soviet order, not from the perspective of counter-
factual history but ‘alternative possibilities that actually
existed at turning points in Soviet history’ (Cohen, 2009: x).
From the veryﬁrst days of the Bolshevik revolution there had
been alternative political currents to the one represented by
the Leninist leadership. Cohen (1975) makes a powerful case
for the Bukharinist alternative, but at various points there
were others, notably the Democratic Centralists in the early
days who fought for a more participatory form of commune
democracy. The alternatives, however, after the ‘ban on
factions’ in 1921 could never take institutionally articulated
forms, and thus inevitably appeared as démarches when
launched from above, and ‘oppositions’ and ‘deviations’
when arising from below. In other words, there appeared to
be no evolutionary mechanism for intra-systemic political
change, and instead change came in the form of shocks and
ruptures. The programme of ‘reform communism’ advanced
during the Prague Spring in 1968 represented a qualitative
change whose radicalism lay precisely in opening up
a historical space for communist evolutionism, but the
invasion by Warsaw Pact forces on 21 August of that yearclosed off this option for the communist counter-modern
project.
c) Change in ideological perspectives and public politics is
one thing, but the destruction of communist governance
mechanisms is another. The main charge that may be
laid against Gorbachev as leader is that he lacked an
effective strategy of statecraft: the mobilisation of
resources to make a country more self-conﬁdent, more
powerful,more respectedandmoreprosperous. Instead,
Gorbachev frittered away the governmental capital
accumulated by the Soviet regime, and in the end was
unable to save the country which he had attempted to
reform. This is the fundamental difference with the
Chinese reformers since the death of Mao Zedong, who
have been masters at the art of managing the Chinese
statewhile nurturing its prestige and strength. From the
perspective of statecraft, as Machiavelli long ago taught
us, democracy is dispensable;whereas for Gorbachev by
the end it became an end in itself, even if it came to be
seen by his opponents as sacriﬁcing the state.
The institutional destabilisation prompted by Gorba-
chev’s reforms is undoubtedly one of the central factors
provoking the collapse. The attack on the nomenklatura as
a class provoked a mass defection, compounded by cack-
handed economic reforms that opened the door to oppor-
tunistic entrepreneurswhile stiﬂing theopportunities for the
development of legitimate businesses. The destruction of
Party management, notably in the September 1988 reforms
to the Secretariat, cut the managerial spine of the whole
system, provoking what Steven Solnick (1998) calls an
extended bank run, in which the state was ‘stolen’. Gover-
nance swiftly disintegrated, with executive decrees left
unfulﬁlled as the country became increasingly ungovernable.
This decay of governance has still not been entirely reversed.
d) The exhaustion of communist ideology is often sug-
gested to be one of the key elements in the Soviet
collapse. Put simply, people no longer believed in the
ideal of building communism, and were no longer
willing to endure sacriﬁces to support Soviet ‘interna-
tionalist’ ambitions abroad. Already Alexander
Solzhenitsyn (1974) had urged the Soviet leaders to
give up what he claimed to be their erroneous and
exhausted ideology, and devote themselves to the
national good. In other words, he called on them to
retain power by giving up their ideology. Andrei
Sakharov (1968) gave this argument a new inﬂection,
and a whole generation of ‘dissidents’ sought to live by
‘conscience’ rather than by what were perceived to be
the increasingly irrelevant nostrums of the regime
(Boobbyer, 2005; Horvath, 2005). If the Soviet leaders
had taken these ideas on board as a fresh analysis of
facts rather than a challenge to their power, history
would no doubt have taken a very different turn and the
Soviet Union could well be in existence today. The
modernist challenge of rationalisation in the Soviet
form of counter-modernity took the form of tech-
nocratism and managerialism, and failed to sustain
a systemic process of public reasoning. In other words,
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absorb critique to adapt its own governingmechanisms.
Instead, the Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev
appeared to do everything possible to undermine the
internal sources of renewal, a process watched over by
Mikhail Suslov, the Vladislav Surkov of his day. Indeed,
Suslov’s unremitting war against theoretical innovation
and his dogmatic interpretation of ideology renders him
the prime candidate to the title of ‘gravedigger of the
revolution’. Even the development of the innovation centre
in Akademgorodok in Novosibirsk, which appeared to offer
the prospect of the renewal of Soviet science accompanied
by greater openness, gradually succumbed to the stiﬂing of
initiative and relative pluralism that was taking place
elsewhere (Spufford, 2010). Given the remarkable ability of
the capitalist system not only to survive but also mightily to
prosper in the post-war years, and the USSR’s rather grubby
reality of increasing social stagnation, it appeared to many
that the revolutionary socialist challenge to market
democracies had failed. Belief in the inherent superiority of
the socialist system to deliver public and commodity goods
in greater abundance and quality once the contradictions of
capitalism had been overcome was no longer credible.
The reappraisal of the ideological foundations of the
regime had begun even before Gorbachev came to power,
notably with the December 1984 ‘ideological conference’
convened by Gorbachev, accompanied by the paper on the
‘living creativity of the people’ (Gorbachev, 2008). Gorba-
chev began by espousing the principles of ‘reform
communism’ but this soon evolved into an even more
contradictory programme for the ‘reform of communism’:
a project that sought to combine reform communism with
the transcendence of communism itself, a hopelessly
utopianproject (in theworst sense of the term) that failed to
enthuse the masses while alienating loyal communists.
Reform communism is predicated on the maintenance of
the communist alternative modernity, whereas the reform
of communism is a syncretic project seeking to combine the
Soviet experience with elements of liberalism, democracy
and – ultimately – the free market. Gorbachev hoped to
create a ‘humane, democratic socialism’ (K gumannomu,
demokraticheskomu sotsializmu, 1990a, b) but he was
unable to provide a coherent rationale or discussion of how
communism was to be both reformed and transcended.
At the heart of perestroika was the attempt to shift from
a legitimation based on the rhetoric of building some sort of
socialism, accompanied by notions of socialist democracy,
to one based on incorporating a more liberal and pluralistic
view of democracy into the project of renewing socialism
(Robinson, 1995). As Pierre Hassner (1990: 5) notes,
‘Communism was dying from its lack of legitimacy, but its
death came when it attempted to acquire democratic
legitimacy. As soon as it submitted itself to free elections, it
was repudiated almost everywhere’. During perestroika
a distinctive subaltern form of democracy took shape, still
subject to an extrinsic purpose (the achievement of
a humane, democratic socialism within the nomos of
reform communism), and not one in which democracy is
removed from a teleological perspective entirely, which is
the characteristic feature of liberal democracies.Thus, the contradiction between reform communismand
a communism of reform created an abyss into which pere-
stroika fell. Gorbachev by the end appeared to be completely
lost, and even earlier he seemed to lack the political experi-
ence to anticipate the results ofhis actions. It is for this reason
that some speak of the ‘suicide’ of the Soviet system
(Fairbanks & Charles, 1990). The decay of belief in the Soviet
futureandpoliticalmismanagementhascarriedover into the
post-communist era. Russia still doesnothave aviablemodel
of its ownfuture, caught inaperestroika-like contradictionof
achieving liberal democracy on thewesternmodel and some
sort of Russian-visaged democratic liberalism.
e) Ethnic and federal problemsareoftenadducedas central
factors that condemned the Soviet mode of state
construction to failure. This is certainly a highly con-
tested argument, and as Henry Hale (2004, 2008)
stresses, very special circumstances have to come into
play to precipitate a breakdown of the system. In
conditions of democratisation where a number of
republicswere aswealthy or evenwealthier thanRussia,
and with a rich arsenal of potent symbolic and actual
grievances, the shift from coercion to consent in the
management of federal relations proved too wide
a chasmtobebridgedby themethodsof perestroika. The
ethno-federal structure in all three communist federa-
tions (USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) provided
the catalyst for disintegration, with the splits following
the lines of republican division (Bunce,1999). The Soviet
Union had in effect been confederal, with the unitary
CPSU acting as the integrative factor. Valerie Bunce
stresses that the structures provided the fracture lines of
disintegration, but thesehadbeenpresent fordecades: it
tookaparticular setof political circumstances set in train
by the speciﬁc form of Gorbachev’s liberalisation to
provoke the global disintegration of the system. AsMark
Beissinger (2002) has demonstrated, it took a peculiar
set of circumstances for the ‘impossible to become the
inevitable’. This raises the question about the precise
point that disintegrative processes became irreversible.
Hale stresses that Gorbachev came remarkably close to
pulling off the renewal of the Soviet Union, and that there
was nothing inevitable about the disintegration until the
August 1991 coup. As late as 1 August 1991, in his infamous
speech in Kiev, President George H. Bush had warned the
Ukrainians against ‘suicidal nationalism’ and warned of the
risks of independence. Gorbachev himself now argues that
he should have begun the reform of federal relations
earlier, since by the time he sought to give more power to
the 15 republics, the three Baltic states had already
declared independence (Steele, 2011). However, a strong
case could be made that the tipping point was the Soviet
Union’s ﬁrst (and last) referendum held on 17 March 1991.
The question itself was posed in a complex way: ‘Do you
consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal
sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of
persons of all nationalities would be fully guaranteed’.
Although over 70 per cent of those who participated voted
in favour, six of the ﬁfteen republics refused to participate
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Five republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia and
Georgia), moreover, held their own referendums in which
the people voted overwhelmingly for independence. Else-
where the question was subtly changed, as in Kazakhstan
where the people were asked ‘Do you think it is necessary
to retain the USSR as a union of equal sovereign states’, and
in other places a supplementary question was added. In
Russia a motion to create a separate Russian presidency
was overwhelmingly carried, and it was clear that anyone
elected to become chief executive of a quasi-sovereign
Russia would come into conﬂict with the Soviet state. In
Ukraine the people were also asked: ‘Do you think Ukraine
should be part of the union of soviet sovereign states on the
basis of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine?’.
The crisis of the USSR was above all a crisis of federalism,
and by this time sovereignty had effectively become
a synonym for independence. The referendum process
demonstrated that the federation was over, and the USSR
would continue at best as a confederation, a particularly
unstable form of territorial governance.
f) Leadership is obviously a central factor in the fall. Even
before coming to power Gorbachev demonstrated
a propensity for Faustian bargains that would later
shape his period in ofﬁce. An early indication of the
compromises to come occurred even before he became
leader. In October 1984, at the height of the miners’
strike in the UK, Soviet miners donated over a million
dollars from their wages to support their British
comrades in theNational Union ofMiners (NUM). Soviet
ofﬁcials tried to channel themoney into the NUM’s bank
account in Zurich but for some reason the money
bounced back. Margaret Thatcher, who at the time was
committed to the destruction of the miners’ union, was
furious. Gorbachev was intent on improving relations
with western powers and thus hoped to put an end to
the ‘second cold war’. Three days before his planned
visit to the UK in December she applied enormous
diplomatic pressure on the Soviet authorities,
demanding to know whether they had sanctioned the
transfer of funds to Zurich. During his visit Thatcher
confronted Gorbachev, insisting that the funds repre-
sented interference in British domestic matters and that
they would help prolong the strike. Gorbachev stone-
walled and claimed to know nothing about the matter,
even though a month earlier he had personally signed
the papers authorising the transaction. In the end Gor-
bachev decided that cultivating the British government,
in anticipation of later reforms in the Soviet Union, was
a price worth paying, even if it meant sacriﬁcing soli-
darity with British workers (Evans & Hencke, 2010).11 Material clandestinely obtained by the young Russian historian Pavel
Stroilov from the Gorbachev Foundation is purported to show other
instances of what could be interpreted as Gorbachev’s duplicity, including
his knowledge of and involvement in the killing of unarmed civilians on
the night of 8–9 April 1989 in Georgia, and then in the Baltic republics on
13 January 1991. See Christian Neef, ‘The Gorbachev Files: Secret Papers
Reveal Truth behind Soviet Collapse’, Der Spiegel, 11 August 2011; in
Johnson’s Russia List, Issue 145, Item 30, 2011.Much has been made of the disastrous consequences of
the personal conﬂict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
Archie Brown (1996, 2007) and Cohen suggest that without
Yeltsin Gorbachev would have gained a historically signif-
icant breathing space to have pursued his reforms to the
point at which a new political equilibrium could have been
established. This is denied by Leon Aron (2012), who
suggests that the Gorbachev reforms were doomed to fail
by their very nature. The Russian leadership around Yeltsin
recognised this failure as inevitable, and from this
perspective, that was their major achievement. The keywas
Ukraine, since once that country prepared to defect from
the Soviet Union, then Yeltsin realised that the Soviet
national project would no longer be viable. The leadership
factor is clearly crucial, focussing in particular on evalua-
tions on Gorbachev’s qualities as a leader. He was certainly
a ‘magniﬁcent failure’, but he was also a ‘tragic success’. His
unstable mix of reform communism and communism of
reform failed to achieve the aspirations of either, while his
statecraft was unable to keep the country together; but he
presided over the internal transcendence of the Bolshevik
system that avoided civil war, oversaw the disintegration of
the country without inter-state war, and achieved the end
of the Cold War without international conﬂict.
g) This brings us on to the role of the August coup as
precipitating the disintegration. Gorbachev had clearly
shown poor judgement in selecting his ﬁnal team,
picking a groupwho in the end almost entirely betrayed
him: Gennady Yanaev as vice-president, his former
university friend Anatoly Lukyanov, and the new prime
minister, Valentin Pavlov. Even before the coup his
former associates, notably Eduard Shevardnadze and
Alexander Yakovlev, had been marginalised. In that
context it would probably be an exaggeration to argue
no coup, no disintegration. Yet, to balance this, if the
new Union Treaty had been signed as planned on 20
August (admittedly, by only 8 out of 15 republics), then
the prospects for the continuance of some sort of union
would have immeasurably increased. As Gennady Bur-
bulis (president Yeltsin’s state secretary) argues ‘The
failure of the August coup was both ironic and tragic. In
taking the extraordinary measures they believed were
necessary to hold the union together, the putschists
ensured its destruction. Without the coup, the union
would likely have endured, albeit in a form that might
eventually resembled the European Union more than
the old Soviet Union. But the three-day stand-off in
Moscow exploded that possibility’ (Burbulis & Berdy,
2011).
h) The role of the West is no less contested. The argument
up to now is that the demise of the USSR was largely
a result of endogenous factors, yet there is a view that
exogenous pressures provided the ﬁnal push over the
edge. In America there is a triumphalist discourse
which suggests that the Soviet demise was a deliberate
act plotted and executed by president Ronald Reagan,
notably through engineering lower oil prices and then
by launching the Star Wars initiative, accompanied by
the arming of the mujahadeen in Afghanistan with
Stinger rockets and by forcefully pressing aheadwith an
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1987 Reagan was uncompromising: ‘Tear down this
wall, Mr. Gorbachev’. A contrary view, adumbrated by
Stephen Cohen (2000), Raymond Garthoff (1994a, b),
holds that the role of the West in the collapse was
minimal. When Gorbachev in July 1989 made it clear
that he would no longer defend the Eastern European
communist regimes, their fate was sealed (Garthoff,
1994b: 400). Indeed, President George H. Bush sought
to keep the Soviet Union together, although he was not
forthcoming with the massive economic assistance that
could have provided a short-term lifeline to keep the
Soviet enterprise aﬂoat.
i) Internal decay was accompanied by an increasing
proportion of resources devoted to the military–
industrial complex, with little beneﬁt for the rest of
the economy. As David Reynolds (2010: 399) notes,
‘. the “iron curtain” between its [the USSR’s] mili-
tary system, on the one hand, and its civilian
economy and society, on the other, was a signiﬁcant
factor in the Soviet collapse’. No less important was
the increasingly bold initiatives undertaken by the
this complex, as the Soviet leadership became
increasingly geriatric, in intervening militarily,
initially indirectly, in Angola and the Horn of Africa,
and then ﬁnally in the most direct manner possible in
the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The
American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 gave an
impression of exaggerated American weakness,
which raised expectations in Moscow that the West
was on the retreat and that the perceived advantage
should be pressed home. This provoked ‘imperial
overstretch’ on a grand scale (Kennedy, 1989).
The paradox still remains: how could a major world
power, with a full armoury of conventional and strategic
weapons and with pretensions to act as an alternative
civilisation to that practised in the West and the second
pole in a bipolar world order, collapse so swiftly and
conclusively. In his study of the role of ideology and foreign
policy, Nick Bisley (2004) argues that the Cold War gave
meaning and purpose to the Soviet state, and when the
country retreated from confrontation with the West, the
rationale for its continued existence was removed.
According to Bisley, the various stages and manifestations
of the Cold War had become internalised into the institu-
tional–structural fabric of the Soviet system. Gorbachev
during perestroika tried to remove the Cold War ﬁghting
aspects of the Soviet system to leave what he believed
would be a truer form of socialism and a more effective and
dynamic society and economic system. Instead, he
removed what turned out to be the essential core of the
system, leaving it vulnerable to collapse.
Bisley repudiates what he considers the rather
simplistic arguments of authors such as Mary Kaldor or
Noam Chomsky, who suggest that the Soviet leaders used
the Cold War as a way of exercising control over its pop-
ulation. Things were far more complicated than that. He
does not suggest that removal of the Cold War prop on its
own caused the collapse, but he does argue that this was an
important part of the story. In essence, during perestroikathe Soviet Union could no longer perpetuate itself as
system of values or institutional structures. However
attenuated the class war aspect of Soviet power may have
become, the structure of values that it represented,
including the prohibition on private ownership of the
means of production, was essential for the normal func-
tioning of the communist system. Take that away (through
the communism of reform), and all that was left was
a power system, naked and greedy. With its system of
legitimation gone, its demise would only be a matter of
time. Under the three-fold blows of elite fragmentation,
economic crisis and nationalism the system disintegrated.
Bisley seeks to transcend the typical stark contrast between
domestic and international by redeﬁning the characteris-
tics of both.
j) The role of popular mobilisation, reﬂecting according to
some the maturation of a Soviet civil society, is also
a key factor. The role of the labour movement was
crucial at decisive turning points (Connor, 1996). The
mobilisation against the coup, moreover, was impres-
sive, given the speed with which the attempted putsch
unravelled. Harley Balzer takes issue with those who
suggest that the coup was met with widespread
passivity, except for some limited resistance in Moscow
and St Petersburg, and examines the politics of memory
which has distorted the true scale of resistance. He
places this in the context of the potential for collective
action, and concludes that ‘Russians mobilized to resist
in August 1991 in greater numbers and with more
positive effect than populations in Europe and Latin
America who were faced with military coups’ (Balzer,
2005: 214). By the end an astonishing 200,000 people
had gathered to defend the Russian White House
against the putschists.
k) Ultimately, the system may have been retrievable if
Gorbachev had been willing to use extensive coercion.
The Soviet Union had multiple layers of security forces,
ranging from various KGB specialist forces, a whole
MVD army as well as a newly-established specialist riot
police, the OMON, and several layers within the Soviet
Army itself. Given these forces at its disposal, it is
astonishing that the political leadership simply gave up
without a ﬁght. The absence of sustained coercion in
part derived from Gorbachev’s fundamental refusal to
operate within the framework of Petr Stolypin’s well-
known injunction that ‘in Russia liberal reforms can
only be possible if the regime ﬁrst clamps down,
because for a Russian any relaxation in the system
represents weakness’. This, however, is an injunction
which Vladimir Putin appears to have taken to heart.
l) The lack of will to ﬁght emerged from what has often
been described as the total corruption of the elite,
accompanied by their total incompetence. The system,
from this perspective, was so corroded fromwithin that
it lacked the capacity to resist. The nomenklatura system
had become a corrupt, piratical, privileged and corrupt
elite (Voslensky, 1984), incapable of evolving into an
active middle class, let alone an entrepreneurial bour-
geoisie. The collective ownership of the means of
production, Milovan Djilas argued, had spawned a ‘new
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modernist projects could be achieved under its aegis,
the fundamental features of the counter-modern pro-
gramme could not. As Djilas (1957: 30–31) puts it, ‘The
Communist revolution cannot attain a single one of the
ideals named as its motivating force’. This was accom-
panied by popular disillusionment after several years of
the corrosive effect of the glasnost’ revelations about
the crimes of the past and the incompetence of the
present. These came to a head over the initial attempts
to suppress news about the explosion at the Chernobyl
nuclear power station on 26 April 1986, with the May
Daymarches proceeding as normal in nearby Kiev a few
days later as if nothing had happened.
m) Perestroika generated a range of social movements and
proto-parties, described at the time as the rebirth of
civil society. However, a notable feature of oppositional
movements at the time is what we may call their
‘terminal discourse’, the belief in the irremedial nature
of the Soviet project and its inevitable collapse (for
example, Tsipko, 1990). The inability to adapt and
incorporate elements of ‘Soviet anti-communism’ into
an evolutionary form of reform communism, intro-
duced terminality into the practices of the communism
of reform (for example, Kutyrev, 1991). In other words,
the fall was preﬁgured in the behavioural patterns of
the political process. It was balanced, of course, by the
obdurate belief in the system’s survivability by a rump
of the old elite.2
It is clear from the above that no single condition can be
identiﬁed in precipitating the fall, and that numerous
factors came together in an unpredictable combination to
create the ‘perfect storm’ that swept the Soviet Union away.
The most sustained attempt to give institutional form on
a national scale to aspirations to achieve a counter-modern
society went with it, leaving a ‘ground zero’ in social
consciousness.Modernisation, modernity and the fall
Having examined the ‘why’ issue, we will now look at
the ‘what’ question, which extends our temporal horizon to
long-term factors.3 Standard accounts of the transitions
from authoritarianism to democracy examine the precon-
ditions necessary for the emergence of a stable social order.
The central problem is the dynamics of social and economic
change, processes that can be summed up as modernisa-
tion (and the obstacles to it), however ambivalent and
questionable the term might have become. There has long
been a debate over whether development is a prerequisite
for democracy, and by the same token, whether democracy2 On the eve of the collapse a large-scale survey of views within the
CPSU argued that the party had a great future since its members had
adapted to ‘general civilisational values of freedom of conscience, civil
society, and the market economy’, Vladimir Boikov, ‘Monitoring
obshchestvennogo mneniya: Partiya’, Dialog, No. 6, April 1991, p. 3.
3 This section draws on Sakwa (2012).is a precondition for development. This debate is part of the
larger literature examining problems of ‘transition’, a term
which is at best nomore than a codeword for the processes
shaping accelerated and conscious transformation of
a society from one type of social order to another, and can
thus be contrasted with normal evolutionary development.
The politics associated with a ‘transitional’ period will by
deﬁnition contain elements of the extraordinary and the
emergency, even when the transition is intended to create
a liberal democratic order in which these features are
sublimated into the operative codes of the order itself. In
the transition to communism, by contrast, the extraordi-
nary measures remained extrinsic to the norms of the
desired society and thus were visible and exposed, and
hence vulnerable to the special type of terminal critique
practiced in the Soviet regime’s declining years and during
perestroika.
Modernisation and development
The fundamental premise of modernisation theory is
that there is some essential link between economic
development and political change, yet the nature of this
link remains contested. In the Soviet case, Isaac Deutscher
and others had long argued that Stalinism was its own
gravedigger, in that it was creating a modernised society
that would ultimately throw off the archaic forms of rule
represented by the Communist dictatorship, yet few were
able to predict the timing and dynamics of the fall (Cox,
1998).
Well before signs of the fall, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1969,
chap. 1) observed that ‘the effort to maintain a doctrinaire
dictatorship over an increasingly modern society has
already contributed to a reopening of the gap that existed
in pre-revolutionary Russian society between the political
system and the society, thereby posing the threat of the
degeneration of the Soviet system;. transformation of the
bureaucratic communist dictatorship into a more plural-
istic political system – even though a system of one-party
rule – seems essential if its degeneration is to be averted’.
Lucian Pye (1990) argued with equal conviction that
authoritarian regimes were undermined by modernisation
processes. As a recent study notes,
Modernization is a syndrome of social changes linked to
industrialization. Once set in motion, it tends to pene-
trate all aspects of life, bringing occupational speciali-
zation, urbanisation, rising educational levels, rising life
expectancy, and rapid economic growth. These create
a self-reinforcing process that transforms social life and
political institutions, bringing rising mass participation
in politics and – in the long run – making the estab-
lishment of democratic political institutions increas-
ingly likely (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009: 34).
Thus the Soviet case only added to the long debate about
the various modes of causality and appropriate methodol-
ogies. In the West there had been a general turn away
from modernisation theory, on the assumption that
ultimately the whole model was grounded on hieratic
westernising logos. Instead, for some three decades the
ﬁeld of comparative democratisation overshadowed
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the process of accelerated change has been examined. The
Soviet collapse forces us once again to ‘bring back’
modernisation theory, but as we shall see below, no longer
in the old form.
The comparative democratisation approach focuses
attention on themechanics of political transition, the actors
and agents involved, and the broad process of the creation
of new democracies, accompanied by analysis of the
reasons for ‘failed transitions’. The central issue of the
political economy of transforming societies, however, was
too often subsumed into the notion of civil society as the
determinative variable (Lewin, 1988), or into glib applica-
tions of ‘globalisation theory’. Out of the debris of classical
modernisation theory and its successors a new focus on
political economy, the power relations of transforming
societies, and the possibility of alternatives within the
transition to democracy, have emerged. While linear
versions of modernisation theory have been discredited,
the creation of capitalist democracies on the western
model has encountered resistance in both Russia and
China. This ‘resistance’ is both particularistic (appealing to
the distinctive traditions and world role of the two coun-
tries), and universalistic, in that the shift to sublimated
coercion and neoliberal forms of governmentality
encounter civilisational obstacles in societies where the
exercise of state power has traditionally been extrinsic to
the operative norms of the society itself, generating in
Russia a whole literature on the historical gulf between
state and society (Tucker, 1972).
Although there are many different aspects to modern-
isation theory, there is one fundamental feature that occurs
throughout in its many manifestations, namely that in one
way or another there is a causal link between economic and
political development. Jeffrey Alexander (1995) identiﬁes
four stages in the trajectory of modernisation theory. The
ﬁrst is the classical period, from the 1940s to the 1960s,
which suggested a staged process of development (cf.
Rostow, 1960), the ‘evolutionary universals’ of Talcott
Parsons, accompanied by a strong relationship between
economic modernisation and political democratisation. In
numerous studies Seymour Martin Lipset analysed the
relationship between the level of economic development
and the emergence of democracy, concluding that there
remains a positive (but not deterministic) correlation
(1959, 1963, 1993, 1999). In a later re-evaluation of his ﬁrst
statement of the question he made a point of direct rele-
vance to the Russian experience: ‘In many countries during
the 1980s and early 1990s, political democratization
occurred at the same time as a profound economic crisis’,
complicating any correlation between economics and
politics (Lipset, 1994: 1). These arguments have now been
incorporated, often in an uncritical manner, into the core
postulates of democratisation theory (examined by
Hadenius, 1992; Karl & Schmitter, 1991; Rustow, 1970).
Another implicit feature of modernisation theory has also
seeped into comparative democratisation studies, namely
the contrast between some sort of negatively-characterised
traditional society and more positively charged modern (or
democratic) society. The fact that the key features of
a modern society are almost entirely drawn from therepertoire of actually-existing modernity in the western
world (particularly America) was a key criticism of classical
modernisation theory; yet when the same trope re-
emerged in the guise of comparative democratisation, it
has been subject to less comment. At the heart of both is
a concept of modernity deﬁned in terms of individualism,
secularism, science, incremental progress, all tending to
some sort of universal model and convergence on a single
model of industrial society.
From the late 1960s the classical model was challenged
by a range of radical theories, focussing in particular on the
relationship between the core and periphery of the world
capitalist system. While classical theory assumed linearity
in development that precluded the need for radical
disjuncture, radical theories once again restated the
centrality of the concept of revolution as a mode of social
progress. The classical model was inverted, and capitalist
modernity was condemned as exploitative and in periph-
eral settings as de-developmental. Under-development
could only be overcome by a radical break that would
instate some form of social control over the means of
production. The Soviet Union was both a model and
awarning, hence the emphasis in much of this literature on
a more humane and democratic form of socialism. As we
have seen, notable challenges to the classical model came
from André Gunder Frank (1969a, b) and Immanuel
Wallerstein (1974 and subsequent volumes). Many of these
were rooted in a neo-Marxist structural materialism that
was susceptible to empirical challenge, as well as lacking
a multiple dimension that could incorporate agency and
ideology.
It is for this reason that a challenge to modernisation
theory was launched from another ﬂank, often allied to
radical theories but refusing to be limited by its rather
limited structuralist intellectual imagination. These are
dubbed post-modern theories by Alexander, and they
remain inﬂuential to this day. Instead of the emphasis on
formally organised systems, post-modernism emphasises
the contingent and the ﬂuid in a representation of reality
that is fragmented, privatised and commodiﬁed. The
exhaustion of the old model of industrial society and the
development of consumer capitalism, the decline of tradi-
tional forms of collective representation is accompanied by
a shift from government (of the old statist sort) to gover-
nance, which operates according to new forms of gov-
ernmentality in which the citizen effectively becomes the
subject of self-disciplining. The onset of more liberal social
policies, and greater acceptance of social and personal
diversity represents a model of late capitalism that in its
social forms is very different from the rigidities of the
capitalism analysed by Marx and Engels. As Terry Eagleton
(1995) argued, late capitalism appeared to have negated all
opposition to itself: the citizen was rendered a consumer,
and greater social and personal freedoms were accompa-
nied by themarginalisation of the political in its entirety. By
contrast, Alexander argues that in fact postmodernism is
little more than another version of classical modernisa-
tion’s emphasis ‘on the private, the personal, and the local’.
Both deﬂated grand narratives of critique and collective
empowerment: ‘The resemblances to radical antimodern-
ism, then, are superﬁcial and misleading. In fact, there is
4 Popper’s central argument is that ‘the belief in historical destiny is
sheer superstition, and that there can be no prediction of the course of
human history by scientiﬁc or any other rational methods.’, ibid., p. iv. It
is for this reason that Popper, together with Friedrich von Hayek, sup-
ported ‘piecemeal social engineering’ against ‘utopian engineering’, ibid.,
pp. 58, 64–70.
5 The paradox is that just at the point that Marxian materialist
historicism hit the buffers of history, it was replaced by a powerful liberal
form of materialist historicism (typically taking the form of globalisation
theory).
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modernism and the period that preceded radicalism, that
is, modernization theory itself’ (Alexander, 1995: 82).
Neo-modernisation theory
This brings us to the fourth stage of modernisation
theory, which Alexander and others dub as neo-
modernisation theories. In response to fragmentation and
the amorphous circularity of post-modern theory the
paradigm of neo-modernisation, dubbed ‘Modernisation II’
by Edward Tiryakian, took shape (1991: 171). The paradigm
took issuewith the emphasis on exogenous factors stressed
by dependency and world system theories by focussing
once again on endogenous factors as well as the scope for
agency (‘the voluntaristic basis of action theory’ as
Tiryakian (1991: 172) puts it), but in contrast with earlier
theories of modernisation argues that ‘It seems patent that
“modernisation” in the world today means more than
upgrading the conditions of economic production,
although it means that also. It also means upgrading the
conditions of the life space of individuals and collectivities
which have been circumscribed by political arrangements
of the state that are viewed as illegitimate’. The main
charge against earlier versions of modernisation was that
they lacked at their core a developed notion of ‘modernity’,
to be distinguished frommere contemporaneity (Tiryakian,
1991: 174). They also lacked reﬂexivity and an embedded
notion of critique.
Further, as Tiryakian states in a rebuke to those who
succumbed to post-communist triumphalism, ‘Part of the
delusion of Westernisation is that there should be a model
of development exportable, applicable everywhere, and
superior morally and technically to all other forms of
societal development’. He goes on to take aim at Parsonian
structuralists and partisans of the ‘end of history’: ‘What
makes the delusion pernicious is when this model of
modernity is equated with a contemporary empirical
society, viewed as the culminating point, the summum
bonum, of societal evolution, and imposed by coercive
means (military or economic) on other societies’ (Tiryakian,
1991: 173). Rather than the fall of the communist systems
denoting an end stage of modernity, the modernisation
perspective was itself modernised to treat ‘personality,
society and culture as interactive dimensions of societal
change.. eschewing presuppositions of a single model of
development or the primacy of any sector’ (Tiryakian,1994:
142). Neo-modernisation contains a dimension of imma-
nent critique lacking in standard theories of comparative
democratisation.
Marxist historicism, the view that the revolutionary
communist movement had somehow unlocked the key to
history and all that revolutionaries had to do was help
events along, in the post-communist era was replaced by
a powerful liberal historicism, in which the real subjects of
change were represented as walk-on actors in a play
written by others. This was indeed a type of ‘inverted
Marxism’ in which Francis Fukuyama and others practiced
an ‘idealist version of historical materialism’ (Callinicos,
1995: 17, 18). Instead of active subjects being engaged as
agents in the making of their own history, historicismirreducibly reduces a people and political agents into little
more than subjects of a historical process whose inner
workings are understood by no more than a select few. In
his critique Karl Popper (1961: vi) ‘refutes the possibility of
predicting historical developments to the extent to which
they may be inﬂuenced by the growth of our knowledge’.4
As the post-communist ‘transitions’ began, the sentiment
was repeated by Ralf Dahrendorf (1990; see also his 1997),
who advocated a piecemeal and incremental process of
change based on open-ended negotiations between civic
associations and governments. This is neo-modernisation
at its best.
There are two versions of neo-modernisation theory.
The ﬁrst, which in this paper will be dubbed ‘critical neo-
modernisation’, arose in response to the perceived inade-
quacies of classical theories; while the second, which in this
paper will be called ‘civilisational neo-modernisation’,
deals with issues that transcend narrow interpretations of
bothmodernisation theory and the concerns of much of the
comparative democratisation literature. Critical neo-
modernisation seeks to overcome the shortcomings of
classical theories of modernisation, with its linearity and
assumed convergence on a western-type model. The
second, civilisational neo-modernisation, takes a much
broader view of the modernisation process to place it in the
long-term context of cultural adaptation of civilisational
complexes to the challenges of modernity.
Critical neo-modernisation theory reasserts the grand
narratives and the logic of causality of classical modern-
isation theory, although in a more reﬂexive form. This was
given a major boost by the collapse of communism in
1989–1991, which appeared to conﬁrm that the western
form of modernity was, after all, the only viable one, and
thus gave rise, as we have seen, to the liberal historicism of
the ‘end of history’ type (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992).5 The three
key sub-systems of western modernity became the subject
of endless theorising in the democratisation literature, all
of which conﬁrmed their centrality: the market economy,
the liberal democratic polity, and a Tocquevillean repre-
sentation of civil society. At the heart of this neo-
modernising model, which shaped the intellectual foun-
dations of the whole ﬁeld of comparative democratisation,
was the notion that the market could act as an instrument
of emancipation through privatisation, competition, indi-
vidualism and contract; all beliefs reinforced by the failure
of Soviet-style collectivism and solidarity. Globalisation
theory then emerged as a way of generalising these prin-
ciples on a universal scale. Globalisation theory restored
a linear trajectory for the modernisation of markets and
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the advanced centres of global modernity.
A second key aspect of critical neo-modernisation
theory reformulated earlier debates about the need for
the appropriate ‘civic culture’ to sustain democracy in
terms of the notion of ‘social capital’ as the intervening
cultural variable between path dependent and continuous
economic modernisation and democratisation (cf. Putnam,
1993; also Putnam, 2002). The debates of the 1960s about
the role of civic culture and popular orientations to politics
had never gone away (Almond & Verba, 1965, 1989) and
indeed, Harry Eckstein devoted his academic life to the
study of the question. (For a collective review of his ideas
from a Russian perspective, see Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffmann,
& Reissinger, 1998). However, during the ‘third wave’ era of
comparative democratisation these debates assumed
a peculiar inﬂection, focussing on the idea of ‘social capital’
and related issues of trust. The notion of social capital
purported to explain why societies at similar levels of
development, and even with similar institutional arrange-
ments, can have such diverse democratic and performance
outcomes. Terms such as patrimonialism, clientelism and
corruption have been enlisted to explain the persistent
personalisation of power and deinstitutionalisation, the
absence of generalised trust, and the lack of differentiation
between the public and private spheres. A vast literature
developed discussing the supposed cultural basis for
Chinese economic success, and indeed, the role of Chinese
diaspora communities in Southeast Asia’s development
(Berger, 1986: p. 166 and passim). Thus, critical neo-
modernisation reasserted the tangibility and relevance of
the modernisation project; that is, a theory of neo-
modernity, together with elements of linearity and the
isomorphism of social forms on a convergent trajectory.
This time, however, in contrast to earlier modernisation
theory, it was the democratic revolution itself that was
exalted, as a form of social renewal as much as a develop-
mental model. This was accompanied by the moral drama
of the fall of communism in 1989–1991, the struggle on
Tiananmen Square in 1989, all the way through to the
North African and Middle Eastern revolutions in 2011. Thus
the sacred goal of neo-modernism is no longer represented
as ‘modernisation’ but ‘democratisation’, which is now the
form in which universal goals can be couched in particu-
laristic forms (Alexander, 1995: 93). Contradictions
however remain, since it has been precisely Russia’s
demand that the hegemonic powers in the international
system apply their universal principles in a genuinely
general manner that has rendered it something of an
outsider (for a general discussion, see Geuss, 2008);
accompanied by Russia’s own selective and partial incor-
poration of the fundamental norms underlying its
engagement with European and international society
(Sakwa, 2011). By the same token, engagement with the
agenda of universalism renders Russia part of the neo-
modern project.
Neo-modernisation restored the primacy of the civi-
lisational complex that had been devised in the West and
which had thereafter transformed the rest of theworld. The
narrowness and linearity of the original modernisation
paradigm, however, gave way to a broader appreciation ofthe contradictions of western modernity while reinstating
the centrality of its key features such as openness and
uncertainty. It is precisely these issues that are at the heart
of civilisational neo-modernisation, an approach that
tempers the particularistic limitations of the critical
version. The concept of ‘civilisation’ in this context is con-
trasted to other ‘social formations as political regimes,
different forms of political economy or collectivities like
“tribes”, ethnic groups or nations, or else religions or
cultural traditions’, and instead represents ‘the combina-
tion of ontological or cosmological visions (visions of
transmundane and mundane reality), with the deﬁnition,
construction, and regulation of the major arenas of social
life and interaction’ (Eisenstadt, 2000a: 2).
At the heart of civilisational neo-modernisation is the
idea of multiple modernities; or put another way, countries
can be modern in different ways, and thus the equivalence
between westernisation and modernisation is challenged.
Shmuel Eisenstadt described the emergence of a ‘civilisa-
tion of modernity’ that was devised in the West, but which
from the ﬁrst was beset by contradictions and antinomies.
As he notes, ‘This gave rise to continual critical discourse
and political contestations which focused on the relations,
tensions and contradictions between its premises and the
institutional developments in modern societies’
(Eisenstadt, 2001: 325). These tensions, combined with
international pressures, in his view gave rise to ‘multiple
modernities’, and by implication, multiple routes to
modernity (Eisenstadt, 2000b). For him, Japan ‘crystallized
the ﬁrst successful non-western modernity’ (Eisenstadt,
2001: 328). Japan ultimately was able to create a hyper-
modern society cast in traditional forms. Although for
modernising societies ‘the original Western model of
development represented the crucial (and usually ambiv-
alent) reference point’, the various life worlds of modernity
(ranging from the family, urbanisation, economic organi-
sation, political structures, media spheres and individual
orientations) were deﬁned and organised in many different
ways. Thus the idea of ‘multiple modernities’ is best seen
‘as a story of continual constitution and recoconstitution of
a multiplicity of cultural programs’ (Eisenstadt, 2000b: 2).
It is this combination that eluded the Soviet Union and
which contemporary Russia is now looking for. The Tsarist
regime failed to incorporate economic modernisation into
the procrustean bed of the autocracy, and when faced by
the pressure of world war, the system collapsed in 1917.
Despite its internationalist revolutionary origins, Soviet
communism under Stalin sought to fulﬁl certain Russian
national goals; but unlike China (or Japan), the Russian
subject was embedded in a larger Soviet ideal. This
precluded the evolutionary adaptation of the revolutionary
socialist ideal to a narrow nation-centred modernisation
project. As I argued above, the Soviet developmental
experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative
modernity, but in the end failed to sustain itself as
a coherent alternative social order (cf. Arnason, 1993).
Arnason (2000: 61) dismisses those who argue that the
communist episode represented ‘a failed revolt against
modernity’, and instead argues that the Soviet system was
‘a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of
modernity, rather than a sustained deviation from the
6 The same strictures of course apply to a possible collapse of the USA.
For example, Ted Rall in his The Anti-American Manifesto (New York, Seven
Stories Press, 2010) argues ‘But we’re not here to talk about the vague
possibility of collapse at some point in the future. We are here – in this
book and within this historical moment – because the collapse feels as
though it is currently in progress’; excerpted on www.alternet.org/story/
148796, posted 16 November 2010.
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mismodernised.
Soviet-style communism represented a signal case of
mismodernisation, not because of any essentialist view that
there is one correct way of achieving modernisation, but
simply because this form of modernity was ultimately
unsustainable (Sakwa, 2010: pp. 15–16, 94–99, and passim).
Soviet adaptation to the challenges of modernity, while
responding to some of its contradictions, failed to develop
a coherent model to cope with the whole ensemble of
challenges represented by modernity. The Soviet system
was founded on the notion of emulation of the western
form of modernity while claiming to resolve its defects, but
ultimately was unable to ﬁnd a way of achieving similar
goals by different methods. Piotr Sztompka (1998: 89) calls
the result ‘false modernity’, containing a large element of
pre-modernity. Soviet Russia failed to pull off the Japanese
trick of achieving an evolutionary form of neo-
modernisation that could adapt ‘the civilisation of moder-
nity’ with Russian particularistic traditions, let alone the
universalistic concerns of Soviet-style socialism. The Soviet
systemwas thus a failed model of modernity because of its
limited adaptive potential; yet this is not to deny its
substantial modernising achievements, albeit at great cost.
The Eisenstadt version of civilisational neo-
modernisation rejects the isomorphism that underlies
classical and in a more attenuated form in critical neo-
modernisation and democratisation theories. Instead, his
work sought to give valance to diversity of experiences and
differences in cultural forms. Already historical sociologists
like Theda Skocpol had restored the framework for diverse
paths tomodernity, while re-examining the basis of what it
means to be ‘social’ (Skocpol, 1984). The fall of communism,
of course, re-asserted a liberal form of historicism, but the
simpliﬁcations of this approach could not long endure the
diverse and harsh realities of the post-communist world. In
a rather different way Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996)
made an analogous case when he talked about the ‘clash
of civilisations’, although his work remained ﬁrmly at the
level of superﬁcial cultural analysis, with no discussion
whatsoever of the socio-economic or ideational founda-
tions of diversity. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ paradigm,
which had long been at the heart of discussions of
‘embedded capitalism’ and the state-led modernisation
paths devised by Germany and Japan, was now applied to
the post-communist world to analyse the very different
types of capitalism that have emerged from a similar
starting point (Lane & Myant, 2007).
Conclusion: 1991 and neo-modernisation
The debate overwhat really happened in 1991, andwhat
it signiﬁes, is far from over. The focus in this question shifts
to the long-term. In certain respects the Soviet disintegra-
tion is not over, with the emergence of Abkhazia as an
independent state, and possibly South Ossetia as well.
Equally, the dissolution of the communist order in the
Soviet Union does not betoken the end of the communist
ideal, as Alain Badiou (2010), Costas Douzinas & Slavoj
Zizek (2010), and many others now argue. Contrary to the
arguments of the liberal historicists, the dissolution of thecommunist project is not over, and neither is the commu-
nist challenge. The fate of communism after communism
has become more relevant with the passage of time since
the problem of the radical critique of the market and liberal
democracy is far from over. While the comparative demo-
cratisation literature analyses how to create and consoli-
date democracy in speciﬁc countries, the fundamental
question may be how to ensure the fundamentals of justice
in new combinations – the core of the original communist
challenge to western modernity.
While the Soviet collapse may have been inevitable, it
was no less unpredictable. The old debate about the failure
of Sovietologists to predict the systemic collapse is
misleading. From the very beginning of Soviet power there
had been voices proclaiming the system’s inherent lack of
viability; but to anticipate the system’s collapse is not the
same thing as to be able to predict the precise timing of the
end of a particular order. Andrei Amalrik (1970) and
Emmanuel Todd (1990) are considered the most prescient
in this respect, but they too failed to identify the funda-
mental dynamics of the collapse. In the end Beissinger’s
impossible becoming the inevitable took place in the blink
of historical time. Or, as Alexei Yurchak (2005) puts it,
‘Everything was forever, until it was no more’.6 The debate
on the alleged failure of Soviet experts has clear ideological
resonance, since it is alleged that ‘revisionist’ scholars
‘tended to exaggerate the Soviet system’s stability and
legitimacy’ (Aron, 2011). The political resonance of this
historiographical debate is far from over.
This applies equally to the modernisation debate. The
civilisational neo-modernisation debate about the viability
of alternative socio-economic systems has been revived in
connection with the ‘rise of China’, and in general with the
emergence of what has been called the model of ‘authori-
tarian capitalism’ (Gat, 2007). However, the view that the
spread of capitalism can be accompanied by profound
political incompatibilities has been challenged on the
grounds that ‘the classic indictment of illiberal government
is essentially correct’, giving rise to unchecked corruption
and other pathologies (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2009: 84). In
a ringing endorsement of modernisation theory, Deudney
and Ikenberry (2009: 86) argue that ‘Looking at the overall
situations in Russia and China, there is little evidence for the
emergence of a stable equilibrium between capitalism and
autocracy such that this combination could be digniﬁed as
a new model of modernity’. The argument is reinforced by
Inglehart and Welzel (2009: 34), who reprise the classical
modernisation case that ‘the conditions conducive to
democracy can and do emerge – and the process of
“modernization”, according to abundant empirical evidence,
advances them’. They concede that ‘modernization does not
automatically lead to democracy’, but they insist that ‘in the
long run [it] brings social and cultural changes that make
R. Sakwa / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 65–7776democratization increasingly probable’ (2009: 38). Thus,
while classical modernisation theory was more concerned
with the problem of ‘backwardness’ and how to achieve
development, neo-modernisation shifts the emphasis to the
consequences, above all in opening up the potential for
democracy. It also makes possible different appreciations of
how that democracy can be achieved and thedifferent forms
of social order in which it can be instantiated.
Gorbachev sought to ‘derevolutionise’ the system, just as
Deng Xiaoping had done; but whereas in China this opened
up the potential for massive economic growth and the
country’s ‘quiet rise’, in the Soviet Union it had the opposite
effect. The long-term effects of the Soviet fall remain
debated. The West had long lived in the shadow of
a communist ‘other’, which in part shaped the West itself.
The development of social welfare systems and inclusive
labour processes in the post-war era can in part be ascribed
to the existence of the Soviet Union, and the ColdWar threat
posed by a powerful protagonist. With the Soviet demise
a new quality of historical time has been introduced.
Already in 1934 Andrei Platonov (2011: 32) had written, ‘A
world without the USSR would undoubtedly destroy itself
of its own accordwithin the course of the next century’. The
Soviet collapse betokens a broader challenge to the
modernity to which it had posed itself as the alternative.References
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